A Spatial-Intertemporal Model for Tropical Forest Management Applied to Khao Yai National Park, Thailand by Albers, Heidi
 
 
A Spatial-Intertemporal Model for 
Tropical Forest Management Applied to 
Khao Yai National Park, Thailand 
Heidi J. Albers 




Resources for the Future 
1616 P Street, NW 





© 2001 Resources for the Future. All rights reserved. No 
portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of 
the authors. 
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their 
authors for purposes of information and discussion. They have 
not necessarily undergone formal peer review or editorial 
treatment. ii 
A Spatial-Intertemporal Model for Tropical Forest Management 
Applied to Khao Yai National Park, Thailand 
Heidi J. Albers 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the application of a spatial-intertemporal model for tropical forest 
management to Khao Yai National Park in Thailand. This type of model, especially the spatial 
components, finds different optimal land allocations than do traditional models at empirically relevant 
levels of benefits. The spatial analysis here suggests that most of this park can be best used as a preserved 
area and also provides support for expanding the park into an adjacent unpopulated area. The analysis 
demonstrates that the park’s benefits to regional agriculture and villagers are large enough that 
preservation can proceed without international support, and that local people, as a group, have incentives 
to maintain most of the area as preserved land.  Although the data cannot support a full case-study, these 
results underscore the need for empirical assessment of the spatial aspects of protected area management. 
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Summary  
This paper links a model of ecological and social constraints on tropical forest 
management to data describing these constraints. Although not a complete case study of Khao 
Yai National Park (KYNP), in central Thailand, this paper examines the empirical importance of 
uncertainty, irreversibility, spatial relationships, and resource dependence by local people in 
tropical forest management. The modeling of intertemporal characteristics of tropical forest 
management generates a quasi-option value that does not contribute much to the optimal land use 
patterns under a variety of descriptions of uncertainty unless the time frame considered expands 
from 15 years to 30 years. The spatial relationships—habitat size, recreational benefits as a 
function of size, a positive externality of proximity to preserved land on resorts, and a negative 
externality of crop damage from proximity to preserved land—appear especially important in 
determining land use patterns. Analysis of the KYNP dataset raises some questions about 
management decisions, such as regulations against using any park land for buffer zones, the 
prohibition on extracting renewable resources from the park’s forest, and the decision to manage 
the area as a homogeneous block. In this paper the KYNP dataset forms the basis for a discussion 
of the relevance of a spatial-intertemporal modeling perspective for a real-world case, the 
potential for efficiency losses associated with some management decisions, and the types of 
research and data required for further policy analysis. 
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A Spatial-Intertemporal Model for Tropical Forest Management 
Applied to Khao Yai National Park, Thailand 
Heidi J. Albers∗ 
Tropical forests in developing countries challenge traditional forest management 
approaches because their ecological characteristics and the manner in which people use them 
place constraints on their efficient management. Tropical forests present ecological constraints 
on intertemporal management because the future benefits from these forests are highly uncertain, 
and some forest uses are irreversible (Albers et al. 1996). Tropical forests create ecological 
constraints on spatial management because externalities, both positive and negative, across 
adjacent plots may contribute significantly to such benefits as biodiversity (Albers 1996). 
Tropical forests present social or institutional constraints on management because of the complex 
policy and property rights setting in most developing countries and because forest benefits 
accrue to a wide range of people, from neighboring villagers collecting vegetables to the distant 
populations that enjoy tropical forests’ contributions to global climate control.  
Governments in developing countries, who typically own and manage the majority of 
their countries’ forest resources, have increasingly employed systems of parks and reserves 
(Repetto 1988; Ghimire 1994).
i As discussed in the growing literature on conflicts between 
people and parks, a government’s emphasis on protection of tropical forests often ignores the 
impact of this management on rural people dependent on the forest resources (West and Brechin 
1991; Ghimire 1994; Albers and Grinspoon 1997). Managing tropical forests by restricting 
access to resources, together with the spatial and intertemporal constraints, raises questions about 
the efficiency of management choices, such as the size of the protected area, the uses allowed 
within the protected area, and the degree to which managers should consider the impact of their 
decisions on rural communities. 
Despite the importance of tropical forests, few studies have linked a model of ecological 
and social constraints on forest management to data describing these constraints. Khao Yai 
National Park (KYNP) in central Thailand provides an opportunity to demonstrate the empirical 
importance of spatial, intertemporal, and social constraints on tropical forest management. 
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KYNP has been the subject of much research, including both ecological studies and economic 
valuation studies, which has generated more information than is available for most similar 
tropical forests. KYNP also presents clear management challenges. The park is not an island of 
pristine forest surrounded by cropland; rather, it has substantial tourist facilities both at its center 
and at its entrances, in one area it abuts a mountainous wilderness, and some of its boundaries 
have been permeable to local villagers taking forest products from a de facto buffer zone (Khao 
Yai Ecosystem Project Final Report 1982; Albers and Grinspoon 1997). Even the relative wealth 
of information about KYNP does not contain the precise numbers for a full spatial-temporal 
model. Nor are the current zones of land uses in and around the park the result of conscious 
management decisions.  
Even though those data restrictions and policy decisions preclude a comprehensive case 
study, the KYNP dataset allows an examination of the empirical relevance of uncertainty, 
irreversibility, spatial relationships, and resource dependence by local people. Analysis of the 
dataset raises some questions about management decisions, such as regulations against using any 
park land for buffer zones, the prohibition on extracting renewable resources from the park’s 
forest, and the decision to manage the area as a homogeneous block. In this paper, the KYNP 
dataset forms the basis for a discussion of the relevance of the modeling perspective for a real-
world case, the potential for efficiency losses associated with some management decisions, and 
the types of research and data required for further policy analysis. 
Ecology, Use, and Management of the Park 
Tropical forests such as the forest in KYNP present managers with the challenge of 
incorporating ecological and social characteristics in decision analysis. From an economic 
perspective, with a concern for efficiency, the park’s tropical ecology requires, at a minimum, 
management rules that reflect the irreversibility of some uses, the uncertainty about future 
values, and the spatial considerations for providing biodiversity. From a societal perspective, the 
social uses and management institutions of KYNP require management rules that reflect the park 
regulations, the needs of local people, and the impact of the preserved area on neighboring 
agricultural land and resorts. Given these ecological and institutional requirements, KYNP’s 
management rules rely on assessments of the types of land uses available and the relevant 
number and size of spatial zones within the area. Resources for the Future  Albers 
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Background 
The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) has managed KYNP since it became Thailand’s 
first national park in 1962. The agency aims to preserve the diversity of flora and fauna that led 
to the park’s selection as an ASEAN Heritage Park and Reserve and continues to attract 
domestic and international tourists, especially birdwatchers. National regulations for park 
management prohibit any other uses of park land, such as extractive collection or selective 
logging. The RFD therefore manages KYNP’s 2,200 square kilometers as a preservation area, 
with tourism and research as the only land use activities. The RFD views the park as one 
cohesive management unit and focuses on offering tourist information at park headquarters and 
enforcing the preservation mandate at the encroached park boundaries. Park managers responded 
to conflicts between their preservation goals and perceived misuse by tourists by eliminating 
overnight visitation in 1992. Tourists and researchers have continued, however, to take 
advantage of the vast resources that KYNP offers.  
Land Use Zones  
Although the park is managed as one unit, the management zones for this analysis reflect 
current uses and ecological conditions and recognize that areas of the park have been subjected 
to different levels of human use, which have changed their  function and value. Figure 1 depicts 
the park’s management zones and their initial uses. Certainly, management zones based on 
current ecological conditions represent only one possible division of the park into units; with 
enough information, management zones could reflect other attributes of the land and changes 
over time. Finer and more management zones cannot, however, be supported with the available 
data. Resources for the Future  Albers 
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Zone 1  Encroached and degraded area
Zone 2  Used by villagers for extracted goods
Zone 3  Relatively undisturbed habitat
Zone 4  Mountainous, largely undisturbed land
Zone 5  Includes a highway








For the purposes of this study, zone 1 consists of 92.4 km
2
 of encroached and degraded 
areas on the outer edges of the park (Khao Yai National Park Management Plan 1987). Zone 2 
contains a 975 km
2
 band of land beginning at the outer borders of KYNP, which villagers use 
extensively for extractive goods (Albers 1992). Zone 3’s 1,043 km
2
 of relatively undisturbed 
habitat, the core of the park, has easily accessible trails for tourists, birdwatchers, and hikers. 
Zone 4 is 21 km
2
 of mountainous, largely undisturbed land that lies outside the park’s borders to 
the northwest. Zone 5 includes a highway that bisects the park, the park headquarters, tourist 
accommodations, restaurants, managed grassland, and park employees’ lodging. Zone 5 Resources for the Future  Albers 
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generates value but is not part of the decision framework because the irreversibility of the 
development option means that this zone will always be developed land. 
Land Use Options and Time Periods 
As in any intertemporal management decision under uncertainty, the reversibility of 
decisions on land use allocations plays a potentially important role in the decision framework 
and, here, in the optimal land use patterns (Arrow and Fisher 1974; Pindyck 1991). In the case of 
KYNP, an irreversible loss of some forest land is apparent in the long-standing regions of grass, 
scrub, or low-biomass forest in some heavily disturbed areas. This irreversible loss appears to be 
the result of popular local land uses, such as large-scale “permanent” agriculture and perhaps 
eucalyptus plantations. Still, the ecological characteristics of the park’s forest include the ability 
to recover to nearly full forest cover, over time, after less disruptive uses. This ecological 
characteristic of recovery over time demonstrates itself in the quality of the forest now standing 
on the many areas that were used for swidden agriculture and nontimber forest products before 
the park’s establishment. These observations about the ecological characteristics of land use in 
and around the park suggest two categories of land development: one land use modeled as an 
irreversible decision and another land use modeled as reversible over time. 
Given those ecological characteristics, the four land uses considered here depict varying 
levels of intensity and reversibility (Albers et al. 1996; Uhl et al. 1990). Preservation (P) 
provides the greatest flexibility because preserved land can be converted to any use in 
subsequent periods. Intermediate management (M) and development (D) reflect conversion of 
the land from its natural state. Development prevents the land from functioning as part of an 
ecosystem and comprises eucalyptus plantations, permanent agriculture, and resort development. 
Intermediate management does not destroy all the land’s contribution to the ecosystem and 
represents the system of swidden agriculture and extractive collection. Although intermediate-
managed land can later support development, reversion to the preserved state requires time in the 
recovery use (R).
ii 
To reflect the timing of land recovery after the intermediate management use, M, and the 
length of most policy plans, a period here refers to five years. The decision framework 
determines the optimal land use for the first five-year period in a series of three periods. With 
this framework, for example, land can be used for intermediate management for five years in the 
first period, followed by five  years of recovery in the second period, and followed by five years Resources for the Future  Albers 
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of preservation in the last period. The framework represents the “five-year plan” as a basic 
decision unit with only one land use permitted within each period. 
In addition to this intertemporal characterization of the land use options, uncertainty 
about future benefits contributes to the management decision framework and to the optimal land 
use patterns. Although the value of all of these land uses is uncertain, the analysis presented here 
focuses on uncertainty about the future preservation values. This analysis models the uncertainty 
about the future values of intermediate management and development as unaffected by 
forthcoming information; the values for these uses are the traditional expected values. In this 
analysis, however, the benefits from preservation of KYNP in the first period are known and 
there is uncertainty about the future benefits, but information arrives to dispel that uncertainty. 
Following the economic literature on quasi-option value, information arrives exogenously over 
time with all of the relevant uncertainty dispelled at the beginning of the new period. The 
preservation benefits may be high or low depending on the state of the world. The probability of 
each state and the benefits from preservation for each state are known in the first period. This 
framework focuses on the uncertainty and exogenous information arrival about future 
preservation benefits to concentrate the analysis on the characteristics of tropical forests.
iii  
Spatial Aspects of Land Use 
Still other ecological characteristics, especially when combined with economic factors, 
suggest that efficient tropical forest management requires a spatial analysis. In general, tropical 
ecology suggests that biodiversity increases with contiguous area (MacArthur and Wilson 1967). 
In KYNP, many large animals, such as elephants and guar, need large areas of contiguous forest 
land (Soulé 1987). In addition, larger ecosystems may attract more recreational visitors because 
of trekking and wildlife-watching opportunities. These ecological and economic characteristics 
of KYNP indicate that the spatial configuration of land uses plays an important role in the flow 
of benefits (Albers 1996). 
Rural people living near KYNP and the resorts that border the park receive benefits 
directly and indirectly from the park, which implies additional spatial aspects to KYNP 
management issues. Nearby resort owners clearly gain from their proximity to the park, because 
their guests  are there to enjoy the park and the cool and low-humidity climate. The agricultural 
neighbors of KYNP continue to collect food and fuelwood from the park despite the threat of 
punishment, and they also gain from the positive externalities it creates, such as watershed and 
soil protection. In contrast, farmers near parks in many parts of the world report large losses from Resources for the Future  Albers 
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the wild animals who destroy their crops (Studsrod and Wegge 1995; West and Brechin 1991; 
Kiss 1990; Schultz 1986). The neighbors of the park, then, clearly perceive an impact of the park 
on their welfare, and that impact should be included in an analysis of land use management from 
a social, rather than a park-only, perspective.
iv 
Because of those spatial characteristics of the benefits from KYNP, decisions about the 
appropriate land use for one zone cannot be decoupled from the land use decisions for other 
plots. An efficient manager considers the impact of the land use decision for zone 1, for example, 
on the land use decision for zone 2. The management zones defined above provide a structure 
through which to determine the impact of spatial characteristics on optimal land use and to 
determine the losses associated with managing KYNP as a homogeneous unit. With additional 
information, the division of KYNP into management zones could be part of the optimization 
procedure itself as a dynamic choice. More detailed zonation is impossible, however, because 
even in the data-rich setting of KYNP, valuation information reflecting spatial characteristics is 
insufficient to inform more detailed divisions, let alone dynamically optimal divisions.
v If the 
management zones employed here, and the spatial relationships among zones, demonstrate a 
significant role in optimal land allocation, that result should be interpreted as an indication of the 
need to generate more accurate information about spatial aspects of preservation and other 
benefits. 
A Spatial and Intertemporal Modeling Framework 
The economic management model discussed here takes the spatial and intertemporal 
model in Albers (1996) and adjusts the spatial characteristics and land use categories to address 
the KYNP case. As discussed above, the economic management model formed to address the 
issues of land allocation in KYNP must have several characteristics: a variety of land use 
options; spatial dimensions; and intertemporal aspects. This model considers four land use 
categories to distinguish among degrees of irreversibility. The model forms a spatial framework 
to examine management of the area as one unit versus multiple units and to recognize the 
externalities associated with different land uses. The model’s intertemporal framework allows 
characteristics of tropical ecosystems and uncertainties about future relative values to be 
incorporated in current decisions. 
As in many models of irreversible decisions under uncertainty, the model for KYNP 
gives a flexible manager an incentive to remain flexible by postponing irreversible choices—
here, the development land use—until information clarifies the value of the choices. The model’s Resources for the Future  Albers 
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closed-loop solution for the flexible manager creates an expected value of preserving land in the 
first period calculated with future information that is as large as or larger than the expected value 
with no information forthcoming, as in the open-loop solution of the inflexible manager (Albers 
et al. 1996; Fisher and Hanemann 1986a, 1986b; Arrow and Fisher 1974). The flexible 
manager’s model contains an added value, called quasi-option value, which reflects the expected 
value of future information if the manager is in a position to take advantage of it. 
In the model presented here, patterns of land uses within a period arise because the 
division of KYNP into management zones creates a cellular structure for the spatial analysis. The 
patterns of use on those zones and the flow of intertemporal benefits among them determine the 
value of the entire park area. The pattern of use creates additional value when, because of the 
proximity of two particular uses, a use in one zone creates an externality. To maximize the total 
value of the land, the pattern’s impact on total benefits should be considered. 
The model here attempts to capture three spatial characteristics of the benefits from land 
use in and around KYNP. To characterize the added benefits of creating large habitats, the model 
adds a value, named P-annex, to the total benefits for every instance of adjacency between two 
preserved zones (see Appendix 1 for notation). To capture the increase in the value of resort 
development due to proximity to preserved land, the model adds a site externality value (S) for 
every instance of a border between a developed and a preserved zone.
vi To represent the potential 
for crop loss on agricultural land bordering preserved land, the model subtracts a crop-loss cost 
(C) when a zone of intermediate-managed land shares at least one border with a zone of 
preserved land. 
The spatial and intertemporal models combine to create a model of some of the 
ecological characteristics and use characteristics of tropical forests and their impact on the 
benefits from land use patterns. The differences between the optimal patterns of the flexible and 
inflexible managers demonstrate the role of forthcoming information in determining the patterns. 
In similar fashion, the differences between patterns formed by a manager who incorporates the 
spatial interdependencies in her decisions—that is, the spatial manager—and a manager who 
does not recognize these interdependencies—that is, the nonspatial manager—demonstrate the 
role of the spatial modeling in determining the patterns. A manager who uses the complete model 
and incorporates future information and the spatial interdependencies is a spatial and flexible 
manager. The traditional manager who ignores forthcoming information and spatial 
interdependencies is a nonspatial and inflexible manager. Falling in between these two managers 
are the spatial, inflexible manager and the nonspatial, flexible manager. A PASCAL computer 
program solves the optimization problem for this four-zone, three-period, four-use case. Resources for the Future  Albers 
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The economic management model developed here reflects the management perspective 
of a planner seeking to maximize total benefits generated by the land and land uses. The model 
therefore includes all benefits rather than just the benefits that accrue to park managers. In this 
sense, then, the model is different from a model that would be employed by KYNP managers, 
who do not consider the impact of the park on rural people, for example. 
Values 
The model permits an examination of management issues for KYNP through the use of 
an extensive dataset that describes the characteristics of the park, the value of alternative land 
uses, and the interaction of the values across management units. This dataset brings together 
information from several studies, including ecological information from the Khao Yai Ecosystem 
Project Reports, planning ideas from the KYNP Management Plan (1987), and economic 
valuation from Dobias et al. (1988) and Dixon and Sherman (1990). To fit the spatial and 
intertemporal model, the data from these sources are divided into per-zone values and combined 
with a description of uncertainty and of cross-zone interactions to form the relevant dataset in 
Table 1. The resulting dataset contains assumptions about uncertainty, per-zone values, and 
spatial values that limit this analysis to an example rather than a full-fledged case study. 
The preservation values sum benefits from three categories: hydrology and erosion 
control benefits; recreation values; and sustainable extractive incomes (Albers 1992). The park 
protects watersheds and provides water for irrigation to the surrounding agricultural lands, 
services valued at 31.7 million Baht, or approximately US$1.27 million, per year (Dobias et al. 
1988). The park’s forest controls soil erosion, which Dobias et al. (1988), using a nutrient-loss 
cost-of-replacement method, value at 75.3 mB/year.
vii The park generates recreation benefits and 
consumer surplus of approximately 35 mB/year, although this estimate may be low because it is 
based on a portion of visitor expenditures and studies of other parks’ consumer surplus (Dixon 
and Sherman 1990; Dobias et al. 1988). Trekking and camping opportunities generate an 
additional 2.6 mB/year of recreation benefits (Brockelman and Dearden 1990). The park also 
generates extractive values of approximately 100 B/day during the six-month nongrowing season 
from the vegetables, medicines, herbs, and meats extracted by the 3,000 local families (Albers 
1992). The park’s preservation values, for this study, include this extractive income despite the 
illegality of this collection activity. 
To value preservation benefits, existing studies have viewed KYNP as a unit. For the 
spatial analysis in this paper, the values for the entire park must be divided into values generated Resources for the Future  Albers 
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by each zone and values generated by patterns of uses on those zones. For the purposes of this 
study, the total park values from hydrology and erosion control are divided on a per unit area 
basis. The recreation benefits are assumed to come largely from the inner core area, zone 3, and 
from zone 2. Of the total recreation benefits for the park, zone 2 is assumed to generate 25% of 
its area-proportional value because of its small size and awkward shape without a preserved zone 
3. The remainder of the recreation benefits from zones 2 and 3 are included as the P-annex 
term—that is, the additional value of having both zones 2 and 3 preserved or the value of 
generating contiguous habitat and recreation area. This valuation assumption reflects the fact that 
if only zone 3 or only zone 2 were preserved, hiking opportunities and biodiversity would be 
diminished. The preservation values for zone 4 and the P-annex value for preserving zones 2 and 
4 come from the value of trekking from local villages into the park. The per-zone extractive 
values reflect actual use in zone 2, use without enforcement of the ban on collection for zone 3, 
and values proportional to area for the other zones (Albers 1992; Dixon and Sherman 1990). 
Again, no existing studies divide the total preservation values by zone, and this study can only 
approximate the divisions. Still, these divisions appear reasonable and allow a determination of 
the role of spatial aspects in allocating tropical forest land. 
For the intertemporal analysis in this study, the preservation values must include a 
description of uncertainty about future values. The preservation values may increase over time if 
ecotourism continues to grow but could also decrease if the wildlife within the park declines or 
other factors prevent tourism. The preservation values here reflect only a small portion of the 
possible range of values because information about the probability of different events is 
extremely limited. The preservation values will clearly be higher if elephants survive in KYNP, 
lower if they do not (Dobias, 1985). The values employed here, then, reflect the benefits 
associated with the preservation of a viable population of elephants in Thailand weighted by the 
fraction of those benefits that KYNP provides (Albers 1992; Dixon and Sherman 1990). That 
contribution to preservation value, 122.5 mB/year, added to the other preservation values, forms 
the high end of the range of preservation values used in the following analysis, corresponding to 
the case of elephant survival. This value is not added to the low-state values for preservation and 
thus forms the distribution of uncertainty for the benchmark case. The probability assigned to the 
high and low states is 0.5 for lack of specific information about the probability of elephant 
survival and about trends in the value of elephant preservation over time. Each zone has a high- 
and a low-state preservation value, although there is no difference between the high and the low 
for zone 1, which does not generate elephant habitat benefits.
viii Again, assessment of 
preservation values rarely includes a range that describes the uncertainty. This attempt, while Resources for the Future  Albers 
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clearly insufficient for detailed analysis, demonstrates the potential role of such uncertainty and 
the need for further study to depict such probability distributions. 
The value of intermediate management depends on the amount of land converted from 
forest land, estimates of local agricultural productivity and extractive collection, and changes in 
productivity over time. Assuming that the intermediate management use, small-scale agriculture, 
involves converting 10% of the forest land to agriculture—an assumption that approximates the 
prepark use of the land—the benefits include the value of farming rice and corn on that area for 
two years before abandonment (Khao Yai Ecosystem Project, vol. 5, 1987; Albers 1992). In the 
third period of intermediate management use on a particular zone, the agricultural value falls by 
10% to reflect the need to start farming low-quality or recently farmed land. In addition, the 
benefits include the value of extractive products collected from the remaining 90% of the zone at 
a rate that is 25% higher than the extraction rate for preservation land. The value received from 
extraction falls by 50% in the second period and by another 25% in the final period to reflect the 
lack of sustainability of this extraction level and the reduction in extractive area as new 
agricultural zones are cleared. The total value of intermediate management therefore changes as 
a function of the number of years a given zone has been in that use. In addition, a zone in 
recovery after the intermediate management use generates a value equal to the fraction of the 
low-state preservation value that corresponds to the average recovery biomass divided by the 
biomass in preservation. Recovery, R, also creates a P-annex value at this biomass-proportional 
rate (R-annex in the tables).
ix 
The crop-loss spatial term described above occurs whenever an intermediate management 
zone borders a preserved zone. In the benchmark analysis here, that term carries a zero value 
because interviews with farmers revealed very little concern for this problem. In the spatial 
sensitivity analysis, though, this term receives a range of values to depict possible outcomes. In a 
rare quantitative assessment, Studsrod and Wegge (1995) report that the highest losses near 
Royal Bardia National Park in Nepal are approximately 35% of the maize and rice crops, which 
are the most important crops in the KYNP example. The crop-loss term (C) can thus be 
approximated by reducing the agricultural benefits from a zone of intermediate managed land by 
35% when that zone borders at least one preserved zone. 
The benefits from the development use come from a variety of large, ecosystem-
disrupting uses, such as permanent agriculture, eucalyptus plantations, and resort construction. 
The agricultural values, gleaned from reports describing productivity and prices in neighboring 
areas, decline over time as erosion occurs (Albers 1992; Onchan 1990; KY Ecosystem Project, 
vol. 3, 1987; TDRI 1986). These declines in value range from an immediate productivity loss on Resources for the Future  Albers 
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hill evergreen soils, to one period (five years) of productivity on dry evergreen soil, and to two 
periods of productivity on moist evergreen soil. The eucalyptus plantation values reflect the 
social profitability of the medium-scale eucalyptus planter who plants between 100 and 1,000 rai 
of eucalyptus (Tongpan et al. 1990).
x These values depend on road accessibility and topography. 
The total development values contain assumptions about the amount of land converted to 
agriculture or eucalyptus, ranging from 25% to 40% of the land for agriculture and from zero to 
20% of the land for eucalyptus. 
In this empirical application, development in or near KYNP receives a positive 
externality from proximity to preserved areas if development includes resort ownership. This 
externality (S) captures the benefits of building a resort near preserved land because most resorts 
depend on access to the park or preserved land for recreation and for local climate control. The 
profitability of a resort in the area is approximated by examining the profits generated by 
Thailand’s Association on Tourism at its golf course, restaurants, and lodging within zone 5 of 
KYNP and correcting for capital outlays and competition (Albers 1992; Dobias et al. 1988).  
Table 1 includes the data input into the computer program for the benchmark analysis of 
KYNP management. The values have been summed over five years for each period at the 
discount rate shown in the table.  
Results 
The data produce a set of first-period optimal land use patterns from the four 
management perspectives: the complete manager with a flexible information structure and spatial 
terms; the flexible and nonspatial manager; the inflexible and spatial manager; and the traditional 
manager with the inflexible information structure and nonspatial model. The four managers find 
the optimal solution but differ in their flexibility with respect  to forthcoming information and in 
their treatment of the spatial relationships. The Thai Royal Forestry Department’s management 
of KYNP does not fall strictly into any one of these management categories, but its decisions can 
be compared with those generated by each hypothetical manager. Figure 2 presents these results 
schematically and allows for a visual comparison of the managers’ plans. This comparison 
identifies the role of the elements of the underlying model, both spatial and intertemporal, in 
determining the outcome. The results and simulations fall into three categories: benchmark and 
sensitivity analysis; policy issues regarding park management decisions; and consideration of the 
assumptions and data requirements for spatial analysis. 
 Resources for the Future  Albers 
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Benchmark Result and Sensitivity Analysis 
The KYNP data from Table 1 create the benchmark case whose results form the optimal 
first-period patterns shown in Figure 2 and Table 2. In the benchmark case, the differences 
between the managers’ patterns come from the flexible and spatial manager’s preservation of all 
but zone 1 versus the inflexible and nonspatial manager’s conversion of both zone 1 and zone 4 
to intermediate managed land. The differences between the patterns employed by the complete 
manager (Table 2, row 1, column 1) and the traditional manager (column 5) identify the 
suboptimality of the traditional approach to park management. The lack of difference between 
the two spatial patterns, flexible (column 1) and inflexible (column 2), implies that the quasi-
option value does not contribute to the optimal patterns at the margin. The differences between 
the spatial and nonspatial optimal patterns (Table 2, column 1 versus column 4, and column 2 
versus column 5) imply that the spatial terms make a significant contribution to the optimal 
pattern. The added value of large blocks of preserved area, P-annex, between zones 2 and 4 
dominates the spatial optima and leads to the preservation of zone 4 in the spatial cases 
compared with the intermediate management use in the nonspatial cases. The other spatial term, Resources for the Future  Albers 
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the positive externality of preserved land on resort development (S), dominates the decision on 
zone 1 as the nearby preserved area in zone 2 creates a large draw for the local resorts. The 
traditional approach, by disregarding spatial interactions and forthcoming information, ignores 
the true land use trade-offs and converts too much land to nonpreservation uses.  
The flexible and spatial manager’s optimal land use pattern remains remarkably stable 
across interest rates. This manager makes no changes to her pattern when interest rates fall from 
10% in the benchmark to zero. At a 20% interest rate, this manager preserves zones 2 and 3 but 
converts zone 4 to intermediate management (Table 2, row 2). She sees that at the higher interest 
rate, the short-term gains from intermediate management overwhelm the possibility of high P-
annex values from zone 4 in time 2, and this pattern permits her to capture high P-annex values 
in time 3. In contrast, the nonspatial managers convert all land to nonpreservation when the 
interest rate is 20%. 
The managers’ patterns also demonstrate insensitivity to changes in the probability 
distribution. At all probabilities of a high state in the third period, all managers maintain their 
benchmark land allocation despite higher quasi-option values at low probabilities of the high 
state. The flexible and spatial manager’s pattern for zone 4 changes from preservation to 
intermediate management when the probability of a high state event in both periods 2 and 3 falls 
below 3% (Table 2, row 3). Similarly, the nonflexible and spatial manager converts zone 4 from 
preservation to intermediate management when the probability of a high state falls below 6%, 
demonstrating the decisive role of quasi-option value in the cases between interest rates of 3% 
and 6% (Table 2, row 4). Even with a lower probability of a high state, increased high state 
preservation values, and low state preservation values that depict no trekking, no foreign 
visitation, and 50% fewer domestic visitors, the flexible and spatial manager maintains the same 
pattern (Table 2, row 5). Although quasi-option value is sensitive to the representation of 
uncertainty (Albers 1996), the managers in the KYNP case reflect little of this sensitivity 
because the quasi-option value contributes to the determination of the optimal pattern in only a 
small range of values. 
The flexible and spatial manager’s patterns demonstrate more sensitivity to the decision 
time frame (Table 2, row 6). In a 30-year case (three 10-year periods) with high state 
preservation values increasing over time and low state preservation values decreasing over time, 
the flexible and spatial manager preserves less land than in the benchmark case by converting 
zone 4 to the reversible option of intermediate management. This long-term manager takes 
advantage of the up-front benefits from intermediate management but can revert through a period 
of recovery to attain the possibly high preservation values in time 3. Demonstrating extreme Resources for the Future  Albers 
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sensitivity to the time frame, the traditional manager assigns the heart of KYNP to 
development.
xi The flexible and nonspatial manager (Table 2, row 6, column 4) does not convert 
this land to development, revealing the importance of the quasi-option value in the nonspatial 
case over a long time frame (Albers et al. 1996). A traditional manager (column 5) who ignores 
option value and spatial terms naïvely converts more than half of the park to plantations. 
Management Policies 
The management framework presented here is well suited to examine policy choices that 
affect the quality of preservation of KYNP and the welfare of local people. The intertemporal 
and spatial framework permits a comparison of one-zone management with multizone 
management, an assessment of social losses from ignoring the value of extractive goods, and an 
analysis of the potential for conflict between local, regional, and international perspectives. 
Although the incomplete data prevent an assessment of the optimal park management, these 
analyses help identify potentially superior management practices and priorities for data 
collection. 
KYNP managers view their park as a single unit for management, as do most park 
managers across the world, despite increasing support for buffer-zone management to address 
conflicts between local people and park goals (Ghimire 1994; MacKinnon et al. 1986).
xii By 
managing the park as a single unit, the managers lose 132 mB, or 5.8% of the park’s value, over 
15 years from the difference in value between preserving all zones and using the optimal pattern 
of land use. The managers also lose the opportunity to use zone 1 in a buffer zone plan. If the 
managers zoned the park for different uses based on current conditions, they could convert zone 
1 to managed land to create goodwill between the park and local people, increase the social value 
of that zone, and provide incentives for local people to cooperate with their broader preservation 
aims within other zones. With current regulations against buffer-zone management, KYNP 
managers spend much of their budget on boundary enforcement patrols, which have nevertheless 
been unsuccessful in eliminating extraction and agricultural encroachment.  
KYNP managers consider the park’s outer zone 1 as a zone in recovery. None of the 
managers in our model, however, employ the recovery land use (R) on this zone. The flexible 
and spatial manager converts zone 1 to the recovery use only when the value of the P-annex term 
between zones 1 and 2 increases to approximately 10 times the benchmark values (Table 3, row 
1). The inflexible spatial manager converts the zone to the recovery use at a slightly higher level. 
With the benchmark values for P-annex, the flexible and spatial manager converts zone 1 to the Resources for the Future  Albers 
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recovery use when the preservation values for that zone increase by approximately 16 times the 
benchmark value; the inflexible and spatial manager requires a 17-fold increase. Both nonspatial 
managers, who do not value the impact of preserved land on resorts through S, allocate zone 1 to 
the recovery use when zone 1 preservation values reflect a 5-fold increase over the benchmark 
values. The decision to allow zone 1 to recover thus appears inefficient over a wide range of 
preservation values. 
The values for preservation used in the benchmark example overstate the values that RFD 
employs because the Thai government’s National Park Act prohibits the collection of extractive 
goods from parks and the Thai parliament closed KYNP to overnight visitors. The legal but 
smaller preservation values still lead the flexible and spatial manager to maintain the benchmark 
land allocation with a lower total value and a dramatic increase in the quasi-option value (Table 
3, row 4). The lower preservation values generate a larger quasi-option value because the range 
of the possible preservation values and the P-annex values are larger percentages of the overall 
preservation value, increasing the importance of the uncertainty and the quasi-option value 
(Albers 1996). In contrast, the lower preservation values lead the two nonspatial managers 
(columns 4 and 5) to convert all the land from preservation to either intermediate management or 
development. For these nonspatial managers, the pure-preservation values associated with the 
no-extraction mandate are outweighed by the values from alternative uses. 
Park managers attempt to enforce regulations against extraction and encroachment 
through policing. Statistics on enforcement expenditures in KYNP were unavailable, but 
managers in other Thai parks spend approximately 8.7 Baht per rai, or approximately US$2.20 
per hectare, on enforcement. If managers spend this amount per rai in KYNP, the total 
expenditure would be 11.96 mB per year. The model’s spatial managers maintain their 
benchmark land allocation when these enforcement costs decrease the net benefits of 
preservation, whether the preservation values include illegal trekking and extraction or not 
(Table 3, rows 5 and 6). The nonspatial managers, however, convert the park’s inner core, zone 
3, to development when they must pay these costs to attain the preservation benefits. Indeed, the 
nonspatial managers convert both zones 2 and 3 to the development land use when they must pay 
the enforcement costs to receive the lower, legal pure-preservation values. Managers make some 
trade-offs between the marginal cost of enforcement and the marginal preservation benefits, but 
they lack both data for valuing the impact of encroachment or extraction on preservation benefits 
and information about the impact of enforcement on rural people’s activities. Although the 
spatial managers do not vary their optimal land allocation with enforcement costs, the nonspatial 
managers’ decisions suggest that research on marginal valuation of preservation, both spatially Resources for the Future  Albers 
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and with respect to quality, and on the impact of enforcement are important areas of future 
research (Robinson 1996; Albers and Grinspoon 1997).  
The local villagers’ illegal extraction of products and agricultural encroachment into the 
park beg the question: How would villagers manage KYNP land? Answering this question helps 
identify areas of conflict between these resource-dependent people and the park managers. As 
managers, the local people would not receive benefits from the positive externality on resorts (S) 
or the P-annex habitat values, but they would continue to receive the hydrologic and erosion 
control benefits, trekking income, and the extractive goods portion of the preservation values. 
They would perform the optimization using this different set of values and decide to convert 
zone 1 and zone 4 to intermediate management. Their conversion of zone 1 to intermediate-
managed rather than developed land reflects their inability to capture the S externality benefits 
that preservation creates for the resorts (Table 2, row 7). Similarly, their conversion of zone 4 to 
intermediate-managed land reflects their inability to capture the value of large habitats. Most 
strikingly, the villagers receive large enough benefits from the preservation of zones 2 and 3 that 
they would preserve them to enjoy sustainable extraction, humidity control, and hydrologic and 
erosion control benefits.  
On the surface, this analysis suggests that preservation of zones 2 and 3 will be possible 
without government enforcement if local people are given access to a sustainable level of 
extractive goods; enforcement and/or incentives for preservation are needed only in zone 4. This 
analysis fails to recognize, however, the difference between a manager optimizing from the local 
people’s perspective and the outcome of open access to these areas. For example, because the 
hydrology and erosion benefits are externalities created by the forest, an individual may 
optimally choose to convert land to agriculture, disregarding the impact of the lost benefits on 
other people. Local people may also exceed the sustainable level of extraction under free access 
to the area without fear of government reprisal. The villagers’ social optimum therefore requires 
some sort of social resource-access rationing. Nevertheless, this analysis demonstrates that the 
social goals of local people and park managers are not dramatically different—a finding that 
should help prioritize enforcement expenditures and encourage communication between park 
managers and local park users. 
Similarly, the global benefits from preservation at KYNP suggest another question: How 
would the international community manage this land? Because current information about the 
park does not include the carbon storage and biodiversity values that would be important to an 
international manager, some approximations must be made. If, for example, the international 
manager valued preservation in the high state by 50% more than the regional benchmark but Resources for the Future  Albers 
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faced more uncertainty, which reduced the probability of a high state to 25%, his patterns would 
be identical to those of the benchmark case for KYNP.
xiii This international manager sees a larger 
quasi-option value—2.88%—from the wider distribution describing the P values, but that value 
does not influence the optimal pattern at the margin. According to this analysis, the international 
community need not financially support preservation in KYNP other than to continue to send 
international tourists to the park. The international manager’s perspective and compensation will 
prove important only where the local value of nonpreservation land uses outweighs the 
government’s value of preservation.
xiv 
Spatial Data and Issues 
The spatial analyses presented here require assumptions to convert nonspatial information 
into spatial data—specifically, about how much each zone contributes to total preservations 
values, how much of the preservation value comes from preserving contiguous blocks, and how 
the proximity of resorts to the park affects their value. In addition, the spatial analyses above 
assumed a zero value for any spatial interaction between preserved and intermediate-managed 
zones. Given the importance of the spatial terms in determining the optimal land allocation in the 
benchmark, these spatial terms are analyzed in more detail here. 
Because the existing valuation data do not value individual zones, the benchmark 
analysis used the assumption, meant to reflect habitat shape and tourism draws, that 75% of zone 
2’s and 25% of zone 3’s area-proportional tourism and elephant preservation values be allocated 
to the P-annex term. Yet the optimal land allocations by the spatial managers display no 
sensitivity to this assumption, because their land allocations do not change from the benchmark 
allocation regardless of the distribution of zone 2’s area-proportional value between zone 2’s 
preservation value and the P-annex term. The optimal land allocations by the nonspatial 
managers change from preservation to intermediate management on zone 2 when the P-annex 
values take more than 80% of zone 2’s pure-preservation values (Table 4, row 1). The optimal 
land allocations of the nonspatial managers do not generate the P-annex values, and benefits 
from development dominate the remaining preservation benefits from zone 2. 
The existing valuation data also require dividing the total preservation values into zonal 
values, as described above, such as the division between zones 2 and 3. When all of the region’s 
tourism and elephant preservation benefits come from zone 3, as opposed to zones 2 and 3 as in 
the benchmark, the spatial managers demonstrate no sensitivity to the zonation and again 
preserve both zones 2 and 3. In contrast, the nonspatial managers convert zone 2 to developed Resources for the Future  Albers 
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land (Table 4, row 2). When zone 2 generates half the benchmark’s level of preservation and the 
other half comes from zone 3, all the managers allocate land according to their benchmark 
allocation. Moving the distribution of benefits toward zone 2 and away from zone 3, the 
nonspatial managers convert zone 3 to developed land when more than 75% of its benchmark 
tourism and elephant preservation benefits accrue to preservation of zone 2 (Table 4, row 3). The 
nonspatial managers receive too few benefits from preservation without most of the tourism and 
elephant benefits to forgo the development option and are therefore sensitive to the division of 
the area’s preservation benefits into zones. The spatial managers, in contrast, receive large 
enough benefits from preserving contiguous plots to make their decisions insensitive to the 
division of benefits across zones. 
The land allocations in the benchmark results above also rely on assumptions about the 
positive impact of the park on neighboring resorts, the S externality. These results do not 
change—that is, all the managers allocate land as in the benchmark case—at S values equal to 
half the benchmark S value (Table 4, row 4). The results for the spatial managers change as that 
value approaches zero, with both spatial managers allocating zone 1 to intermediate-managed 
land rather than to development. The land allocations for all managers contain no zones of 
development for values of S below zero (Table 4, row 5). 
Thus far, the data have reflected the information, gathered in interviews, that benefits 
from zones in the preserved land use and zones in intermediate management do not change with 
proximity to each other. Although this information represents the KYNP case, reports from 
neighboring parks of lost agricultural production due to damage by wild animals suggest that the 
benefits from these two land uses interact in many cases (Studsrod and Wegge 1995; West and 
Brechin 1991; Schultz 1986). We show no S externality (Table 4, row 5) because the benchmark 
result has no borders of the intermediate-managed land and preserved land to examine. Using 
information from Studsrod and Wegge, who find crop damage as high as 35%, and reducing the 
agricultural values of the intermediate management use do not, however, change the optimal land 
allocations for the KYNP case, and all managers continue to allocate zone 1 to intermediate 
management next to zone 2’s preserved land (Table 4, row 6). At higher values, however, such 
as a 50% crop damage rate, the spatial managers convert zone 1 to the developed land use 
despite the zero-valued site externality (Table 4, row 7). 
Similar to the crop damage example but working in the opposite direction, the benefits 
from intermediate management may increase with proximity to preserved land because the 
farmers gain access to the extractive products in the preserved zones. When the extractive 
benefits heretofore contained in the preservation benefits accrue only to people who border the Resources for the Future  Albers 
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preserved zone rather than to the preserved zone itself, the two externalities between 
intermediate management and preservation benefits offset each other to some degree. For 
example, in the case of the preservation values without the value from extraction (as in row 4 of 
Table 3) and with the crop damage externality set at 35%, both spatial managers employ the 
intermediate management use on zone 1 only. But including the positive externality of the 
benefits from extraction in the preserved area induces both spatial managers to create an 
additional border between intermediate management and preservation by converting both zones 
1 and 4 to intermediate management (Table 4, row 8). The example of a trade-off between crop 
losses and easy access to extractive products appears relevant in many settings. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The application of a multizone, intertemporal economic model in Khao Yai National 
Park, Thailand, demonstrates the empirical importance of intertemporal and spatial modeling of 
social and ecological factors in tropical forest management. In this real-world example, the 
intertemporal and spatial model generates some land allocations that are strikingly different from 
those created by models that focus on one plot or ignore forthcoming information. The direct 
modeling of the spatial and intertemporal characteristics of the park decreases the sensitivity of 
the optimal land allocations to assumptions about discount rates. The modeling of the 
intertemporal characteristics of tropical forest management generates a quasi-option value that 
does not contribute much to the optimal land use patterns under a variety of descriptions of 
uncertainty unless the time frame considered expands from 15 years to 30 years. The spatial 
relationships—habitat size, recreational benefits as a function of size, a positive externality of 
proximity to preserved land on resorts, and a negative externality of crop damage from proximity 
to preserved land—appear especially important in determining land use patterns.  
The optimal land allocations in the benchmark demonstrate the importance of spatial 
modeling, but these values contain assumptions because limited information exists to describe 
the spatial valuation. The optimal land allocations for the spatial managers do not change 
dramatically even with large changes in the way preservation benefits are divided across zones 
and the spatial term, P-annex. In a policy setting, the optimal land allocations should reflect 
preservation valuation aimed at quantifying the per-zone values and the value of spatial 
interactions across zones rather than preservation valuation that divides the benefits after the 
collection of valuation data. The optimal land allocations in this example reflect some sensitivity 
to the size of the spatial term describing the impact of preserved land on resorts and, without this 
resort site externality, to the amount of crop loss incurred on small agricultural plots near Resources for the Future  Albers 
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preserved land. Nevertheless, the benchmark land allocations hold over a wide range of 
assumptions about the size of these spatial values. 
Although data limitations preclude a detailed case study for policy, the spatial analysis 
here suggests that most of the park area is optimally used as a preserved area when the spatial 
benefits are included in the valuation. In addition, this analysis provides economic support for 
expanding the park to include a relatively undisturbed and unpopulated area to the northwest of 
the park. Even though the park provides benefits to the global community, this analysis 
demonstrates that Thailand captures enough benefits from KYNP to continue its preservation 
without international support. The park also provides benefits to regional agriculture and 
villagers that are large enough to indicate that local people, as a group, have incentives to 
maintain most of the area as preserved land. 
Given the recent literature on the potential contribution of preserved areas toward 
achieving the dual goal of preservation and local development (Albers and Grinspoon 1997; 
Studsrod and Wegge 1995; Ghimire 1994; Hough 1988), the spatial and intertemporal analysis of 
current management practices in KYNP reveals ways to increase the social benefits from the 
park. First, managing the park as one homogeneous unit with the same level of preservation 
throughout leads to social losses in the area near the park boundaries because those degraded 
areas produce a higher value in nonpreservation uses. Second, the restrictive definition of 
preservation leads to social losses because the goals of generating tourism revenues and 
preserving species could be met while allowing villagers to extract limited amounts of nonmeat 
products from the park. The combination of these two factors and the lack of incentives for local 
people to help preserve the area suggests that developing a buffer-zone policy on the park’s 
degraded outer boundary regions and creating incentives for preservation rather than relying 
exclusively on enforcement would lead to long-term preservation of the resource and to 
permanent increases in the welfare of local villagers. 
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Appendix 1: The Economic Management Model and Notation 
The economic management model employed here contains spatial and intertemporal 
components. The spatial components allow an examination of externalities and of the decision to 
manage the park as a single unit. The intertemporal components model irreversible decisions 
under uncertainty. The land manager optimally allocates one of four land uses on each zone of 
the park for the first of three periods. Finding that optimal allocation requires solving the model 
with a PASCAL computer program that computes the value of all possible land use patterns and 
selects the largest present value from the perspective of four managers: the flexible and spatial 
manager, the flexible and nonspatial manager, the inflexible and spatial manager, and the 
inflexible and nonspatial manager (Albers 1996; Albers 1992). 
The two spatial managers add externality values whenever the land use pattern meets the 
requirements that provide those values. When a pattern contains two preserved plots that border 
one another, the manager adds the P-annex value to the total value of that pattern. When a 
pattern contains a developed plot bordering a preserved plot, the manager adds the site 
externality value (S) to the total value of that pattern. When a pattern contains an intermediate 
managed plot next to a preserved plot, the manager subtracts the crop-loss cost (C) for the total 
value of that pattern. 
The two inflexible managers use an open-loop framework to determine their first-period 
optimal land allocation and therefore do not incorporate future information into their decisions. 
The inflexible managers’ expected value from preserving a zone in the first period is 
V* P   = P1 + max{E1[P2] + max(E1[P3],M3,D3); M2 + max(R3,M3,D3); D2 + D3} 
where all expectations are taken using only the first period’s level of information and subscripts 
reflect the time period. (Following Albers et al. 1996, the uncertainty occurs across periods; the 
uncertainty about benefits from preservation for a particular period is completely resolved at the 
beginning of that period. The uncertainty could be dispelled in other ways, such as through 
partial learning over, as in an example in Albers et al. 1996, or through learning by doing, as in 
Miller and Lad 1984. These types of information arrival do not appear important in the KYNP 
case because the time frame is relatively short and the benefits from the alternative land uses are 
well identified by their use in the surrounding region.) The inflexible managers compare the 
expected value of first-period preservation (V* P ) with that of management or development and Resources for the Future  Albers 
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implement in the first period the use that generates the highest expected value over the resulting 
stream. 
The flexible managers recognize that information is forthcoming that will improve their 
ability to make decisions in future periods and place a value on remaining flexible enough to use 
that information. Although the flexible managers, like the inflexible managers, form expectations 
based on information in first period (E1), the flexible managers’ maximum expected value is 
calculated using the closed-loop control rule: 
V' P   = P1 + E1[max(P2 + max(P3,M3,D3); M2 + max(R3,M3,D3); D2 + D3)]. 
This framework’s control rule allows the flexible manager to recognize the value of the future 
information in the first-period calculations. The flexible manager compares the possible 
maximum outcomes in her decision, as shown in the equation by bringing the expectation 
outside of the max operator, in contrast to the inflexible manager’s comparison of the average 
outcomes. 
As discussed in the text, the quasi-option value is the difference: V* P   - V' P   ≥ 0. 
Two states of the world, high and low, capture the uncertainty about future preservation benefits 
and future P-annex values. The high state of the world occurs with probability pr(hi) and reflects 
a period of high preservation benefits. The manager chooses the land use on each of the zones for 
the first period. The four uses come from a set of possible actions, At
j made up of uses at
j, where 
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            Irreversibility Constraints: 
1. if at
j =  D then at+1
j , at+2
j = D
2.  if at
j  =  M then at+1
j ≠ P  and at+2
j =  P iff at+1
j = R
Valuation and Uncertainty :




j =  D and iff at
j+1 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(D) +  S
2. if  at
j =  M and iff at
j+1 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(M) - C
For j  =  2 and k =1, 3, and 4 :
1. if at
j =  D and iff at
k =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(D) + S
2. if  at
j =  M and if any at
k =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(M) -  C
For j = 3:
1. if at
j =  D and iff at
j-1 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(D) +  S
2. if  at
j =  M and iff at
j-1 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(M) - C
For j  =  1, 2 :
1. if at
j =  P and iff at
j+1 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(P) + P-annex
For j  =  4 :
1. if at
j =  D and iff at
2 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(M)  + S
2. if at
j =  P and iff at
2 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(P)  + P-annex
3. if  at
j =  M and iff at
2 =  P then v(at
j)  =  u(M) -  C
(The spatial terms S and P-annex are added for each relevant border while the spatial term C is 
subtracted when one or more borders with preservation zones occur with a zone in intermediate 
management.  The value of each spatial term depends on the zones involved as seen in Table 1: 
KYNP Data.) Resources for the Future  Albers 
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Table 1: KYNP Data: Benchmark Values* 







R value  D value 
1 1 high  16.73  28.98      1.22  50.64 
  l o w   1 6 . 7 3        
  2  high  10.39 18.00 14.55   0.76  25.79 
  l o w   1 0 . 3 9        
  3  high 6.45 11.17  9.04 5.71   2.74 
  l o w   6 . 4 5        
2  1  high  455.04  305.83     846.13 
  low  404.05       
  2  high  282.54 189.90 153.55   181.61 422.22 
  low  250.88       
  3  high  175.44 117.91 95.35  66.00    197.67 
  low  155.78       
3  1  high  424.54  266.97     820.16 
  low  288.37       
  2  high  263.61 165.77 145.58   129.61 466.73 
  low  179.05       
  3  high  163.68 102.93 90.39  64.80    156.21 
  low  111.18       
4  1  high  8.11  11.18     9.36 
  l o w   8 . 1 1        
  2  high 5.04 6.94 4.06   3.65 5.81 
  l o w   5 . 0 4        
  3  high 3.13 4.31 2.52 1.42   3.61 
  l o w   3 . 1 3        
5  1  high  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 46.43 
  l o w         
  2  high  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.32 
  l o w         
  3  high  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a  3.95 
  l o w         
n.a.= not applicable because of starting point in irreversible development 
*All values are in 1990 million Baht increments (1 Baht = US$0.04). All values are the sum of five years (one 
period) of benefit flow. All sums are in present value terms, calculated with a discount rate of 10%. Where only one 
value is entered, the same value is used for the high and low events. 
** “A value” is the value of the M option during the first period of its use,  “B value” is that value in the second 
period of use, and “C value is that value during the third period of use. Resources for the Future  Albers 
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Table 1: KYNP Data: Benchmark Values, continued 
 
Zone Time State  P-ann  R-ann  S  C 
1 - 2  1  high  26.42  2.27  111.14  0.00 
  low  0.00  0.00  111.14   
  2  high  16.41 1.04  69.01 0.00 
  low  0.00  0.00  69.01   
  3 high  10.19  * 42.85  0.00 
  low  0.00   42.85   
2 - 3  1  high  414.34  *  46.24  0.00 
  low  74.23   46.24   
 2  high  257.27  6.13  28.71  0.00 
  low  46.09  1.09  28.71   
  3 high  159.75  * 17.83  0.00 
  low  28.62   17.83   
2  -  4  1 high  39.88  * * 0.00 
  low  0.09     
  2 high  24.76  0.64  * 0.00 
  low  0.06  0.00    
  3 high  15.38  * * 0.00 
  low  0.03     
3  -  5  1 high  * * 73.22  * 
  l o w     7 3 . 2 2    
  2 high  * * 45.47  * 
  l o w     4 5 . 4 7    
  3 high  * * 28.23  * 
  l o w     2 8 . 2 3    
 
*Value not applicable due to initial zone use. Resources for the Future  Albers 
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis 











Benchmark  DPPP DPPP 0.03  MPPM  MPPM 
i=20% DPPM DPPM 0.17  MDDM  MDDM 
pr(hi)<3%  DPPM DPPM 0.43  MPPM MPPM 
3<pr(hi)<6 DPPP  DPPM  0.64  MPPM  MPPM 
P  spread  DPPP DPPP 1.35  MPPM  MPPM 
30  years  DPPM DPPM 0.50  MPPM MDDM 
 
Table 3: Policy Results 











10x Bench.  RPPP  DPPP  0.89  MPPM  MPPM 
16x Bench.  RPPP  DPPP  0.89  RPPM  RPPM 
5x  Bench.  DPPP DPPP 0.03  RPPM  RPPM 
legal P value  DPPP  DPPP  2.26  MDDM  MDDM 
P - enf.  DPPP  DPPP  1.76  MPDM  MPDM 
legal P - enf.  DPPP  DPPP  4.06  MDDM  MDDM 
local  persp.  MPPM MPPM 0.00  n.a.  n.a. 
 
Table 4: Spatial Sensitivity Analysis 












>80%  P-ann.  DPPP DPPP 0.02  MMPM  MMPM 
zone 2 P in 3  DPPP  DPPP  0.02  MDPM  MDPM 
zone 3 P in 2  DPPP  DPPP  0.31  MPDM  MPDM 
S=0.5  *S  DPPP DPPP 0.23  MPPM  MPPM 
S=0  MPPP MPPP 1.67  MPPM  MPPM 
S=0;  C=35%  MPPP MPPP 1.48  MPPM  MPPM 
S=0;  C=50%  DPPP DPPP 1.48  MPPM  MPPM 
C=35%+EXT  MPPM MPPM 4.50  MPPM MPPM 




                                                 
i Although the example developed here considers the management of a tropical forest in a park, many of the 
results can be generalized to a nonpark setting where efficient land use allocation is the goal. 
ii The conversion from one land use to another land use always requires some time. This model and 
application reflect the ecological information that the conversion time to the M or D uses is short compared with the 
amount of time it takes for forests to recover after the M use. 
iii The assumption that no new information will arrive before a decision must be made to dispel uncertainty 
about M and D simplifies the analysis and focuses the framework on the considerable uncertainty about preservation 
benefits. This assumption does, however, bias the optimal land uses toward the less flexible land uses, M and D, 
because a model that allowed for forthcoming information about these land uses would contain incentives to wait in 
the flexible land use until that information ruled out a “bust” in the D or M values (Albers 1997). 
iv The economic enforcement literature contains some discussion of whether illegal activities, such as the 
extraction of fuelwood and food from KYNP, create positive benefits from a social perspective and about the weight 
a planner should assign to these benefits (Cite). In its attempt to demonstrate the empirical importance of spatial and 
intertemporal aspects of tropical forest management rather than to form policy prescriptions for KYNP managers, 
this paper takes a planner’s perspective by including benefits that accrue outside the park rather than the perspective 
of a park manager who values preservation alone. 
v Theoretical analyses, such as Epstein (1980) and Hanemann (1989), indicate that when the spatial trade-
off between a reversible and an irreversible land use is continuous, as opposed to the discrete blocks imposed here, 
no quasi-option value is generated. The information available for making such trade-offs in an empirical setting, 
however, limits the application of this result. 
viDeveloped land may create a negative externality on neighboring preserved land through edge effects and 
pollution. This paper assumes that both intermediate-managed land and developed land create the same externality 
on preserved land and that the per-plot preservation values are net of that externality. The P-annex term can thus be 
thought of as the added value of avoiding the negative externality created by nonpreservation uses on neighboring 
plots. 
vii Unless otherwise stated, all values are 1990 baht. One baht is approximately US$0.04. 
viiiIn a fuller analysis that includes other values—such as carbon storage, existence value for other species, 
local and global climate control, and an assessment of marketable forest products—the probability distribution 
would reflect the likelihood that each of these values will matter in the future. In this empirical example, however, 
the values incorporated are values that RFD has at hand. The 50-50 probability distribution is a guess on whether 
elephants will survive and/or be highly valued in the future. See Albers (1996) for a theoretical examination of the 
impact of the probability distribution on quasi-option value and land use plans. 
ixThe remaining 90% of the plot provides nearby seed sources and protection from erosion for the 
deforested plots. The agricultural land can recover from the use through these protection and recuperation 
mechanisms. With smaller management plots this interaction would occur across plots, and recovery of one area 
would depend on preservation in nearby areas (Uhl et al. 1990; Albers 1996). 
x The Thai unit of measurement, the rai, is equal to approximately 1,600 square meters. 
xi This conversion to developed land does not reflect a large resort-generated S value because this occurs in 
the nonspatial case. 
xiiBuffer zones that surround a core preservation area are areas in which different levels of land use are 
permitted. These areas serve the dual purpose of reducing local people’s dependence on the core area and of Resources for the Future  Albers 
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mitigating the border and edge effects on the ecosystem of that core area. KYNP managers are constrained by 
federal regulations that prohibit buffer-zone use of park land. Many conservationists support this position by arguing 
that only land outside parks should ever be used for buffer zones (MacKinnon et al. 1986) and that no reallocation of 
parkland toward nonpreservation uses is appropriate. In the KYNP case, the development of a buffer zone outside 
the park would require removing people from their land. 
xiiiStudies attempting the valuation of these tropical forest benefits have only recently begun to appear in the 
literature. This study simply demonstrates the impact rather than attempting to realistically value these benefits. 
xiv This statement assumes that the government is both willing and able to manage the land for the 
economically efficient land use pattern. In some countries the government may not capture enough of the 
preservation benefits to generate a budget, or may have other budgetary issues limiting its ability to enforce the 
optimal management scheme. 